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OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Given the structure of plaintiff's Statement of Facts in 
his responding Brief, it is difficult to tell if the plaintiff is 
challenging the Lower Court's Findings of Fact or providing support 
in the record for the Lower Court's Findings of Fact. It is almost 
impossible to tell how much of each paragraph is the Lower Court's 
finding and how much is "fact" plaintiff wished the Lower Court had 
found. Plaintiff paraphrases "facts" allegedly in the record in 
such a way as to be argument. Many of the citations are wrong; 
that is, the testimony on the cited pages do not provide the basis 
for the articulated "fact." Gem will identify each specific 
objection it has within the context of each of plaintiff's 
"Findings." 
Plaintiff's Finding No. 2: No testimony in the cited 
pages of the transcript or Addendum 3 support plaintiff's statement 
that his position teaching violin at Prier's Violin Making School 
was a "modest position for him", or that such a position was all 
plaintiff could handle because of his 1983 auto accident. 
Furthermore, the transcript at pages 51 and 55 show testimony 
unrelated to plaintiff's violin teaching, his monthly salary or his 
hours of employment. 
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Plaintiff's Finding No. 3: The transcript citation of 
page 41 is incorrect; it does not say what plaintiff claims it 
says. Also, there is no evidence at page 51 of the transcript, or 
anywhere else in the transcript, that plaintiff told a "Gem State 
agent" his health needs. The person with whom plaintiff discussed 
his health needs was an independent insurance broker, not an agent 
of the defendant. Transcript at 44-50. Also, there is no evidence 
in the record as to what the independent agent said to the 
plaintiff; the plaintiff attempted to get in such hearsay 
testimony, but defendants Objection on that ground was sustained. 
Transcript at 44. 
Plaintiff claims that the University of Utah Pain Clinic 
contacted the defendant and obtained pre-authorization to admit the 
plaintiff. The cited portions of the transcript reflect testimony 
of one of plaintiff's physicians, Dr. Heil. In fact, Dr. Heil had 
no personal knowledge of The Pain Clinic obtaining pre-
authorization from the defendant of plaintiff's treatment at The 
Pain Clinic. Transcript at 75-76. 
Plaintiff's Finding No. 11; Defendant's general counsel 
never stated that defendant should have walked over to plaintiff's 
place of employment and personally inspected the employment 
records. The citation to the transcript at pages 456 and 477 is 
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incorrect. Furthermore, although defendant had the authority in 
its master policy to inspect the records of plaintiff's employer 
at any time during normal business hours, plaintiff testified at 
trial that his employer advised him not to cooperate with the 
defendant. Transcript at 197. 
Plaintiff's Finding No. 13; Plaintiff mischaracterizes 
Carolyn Ivie's trial testimony and then miscites to the record at 
the pages 75-77 of the transcript (which is actually defendant's 
counsel's cross-examination of Dr. Heil) and Addendum 4 of 
plaintiff's Brief (which is a letter from Shirley Sunderland). 
Plaintiff then spends almost two pages discussing the 
number of hours he claims defendant required him to work in order 
that he be eligible for health insurance. In fact, defendant's 
general counsel testified that the number of hours plaintiff worked 
was never at issue; what was at issue was whether plaintiff was 
employed. Transcript at 456. The Lower Court agreed with this. 
Finding 13. The Lower Court found that defendant's investigation 
of plaintiff's employment did not seek evidence of how many hours 
plaintiff worked per month. All of plaintiff's allegations in his 
Statement of Facts and argument to the contrary are without support 
in the record or in the Lower Court's Findings of Fact. 
Plaintiff's claim of "Fact" that plaintiff's eligibility had been 
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"misjudged" by defendant based on a one thousand hour rule is 
without basis in the record. 
Plaintiff's Finding No. 15: 
(a) First paragraph — This is all argument. The pages 
cited by plaintiff in the transcript at 92 and 94-96 deal only with 
plaintiff's testimony as to his contacts with the defendant, not 
any regression in his medical condition. 
(b) Second paragraph — Again, plaintiff raises the red 
herring of a one thousand hour rule, which is not at issue in this 
litigation. Plaintiff did not cross-appeal seeking a new Finding 
of Fact on this "fact;" therefore, it cannot be argued at this 
time. 
(c) Third paragraph — Whether plaintiff's employer was 
an unsophisticated businessman is not supported in the record, nor 
it is relevant to this litigation. 
(d) Fourth paragraph — Plaintiff claims that the 
defendant never told plaintiff's employer why his two letters 
reflecting plaintiff's hours of work were unacceptable. However, 
the Lower Court found (at Findings 7 and 10) that on two occasions 
defendant wrote letters to plaintiff's employer requesting specific 
payroll information, not merely self-serving letters from 
plaintiff's employer stating, without any independent record 
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verification, that plaintiff was employed. 
(e) Fifth paragraph — Again, plaintiff mischaracterizes 
defendant's general counsel's testimony. The testimony in the 
cited transcript pages 262, 296 and 456 have nothing to do with 
what plaintiff claims they do. Defendant's general counsel 
testified that, in light of all the litigation (and, implicitly, 
even though defendant was not in any way obligated to do so) , maybe 
the defendant should have talked to plaintiff's employer personally 
and explained in large print what defendant wanted. 
(f) Seventh paragraph — Plaintiff blatantly 
mischaracterizes Carolyn Ivie's testimony. Ms. Ivie testified that 
defendant did not complete their investigation in forty-five days 
because of plaintiff's delays. The citation of the transcript at 
540 is incorrect. Furthermore, she testified that plaintiff was 
notified within twenty (20) days of his claim of defendant's delay 
in processing while medical records were being obtained. 
Transcript at 323. 
Plaintiff's Finding No. 17; Plaintiff claims that Gerald 
Ottley of the Mormon Tabernacle Choir testified that had "this 
incident" (what incident? his December 1983 accident? the alleged 
wrongdoing of defendant?) not occurred, plaintiff would have been 
very well established nationwide as a conductor making a 
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substantial living. In fact, contrary to plaintiff's claim, Mr. 
Ottley testified that without Plaintiff's automobile accident in 
1983, "and also admitting there is a great deal of serendipity 
involved in building a career, I think with the right breaks he 
would have been very well established nationwide." Transcript at 
223. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
Plaintiff has failed to rebut defendant's arguments with 
regard to the inadequacies of the Lower Court's Findings of Fact 
and the error of the Lower Court's Conclusions of Law with regard 
to the alleged breach by defendant of its insurance contract with 
plaintiff and its implied contractual covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing with plaintiff. Plaintiff has further failed to 
substantively rebut defendant's argument that the Lower Court's 
award of costs to Plaintiff was error in amount; that the Lower 
Court's award of consequential damages was based upon speculative 
evidence, if any evidence at all; that the Lower Court's denial of 
newly-found evidence at trial was error; and that the denial of 
defendant's Counterclaim for Attorney's Fees was error. Because 
plaintiff has failed to rebut defendant's arguments, either legally 
or with citations to the record, this Court should reverse the 
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Lower Court's Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and for judgment 
on behalf of defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHETHER DEFENDANT PRE-AUTHORIZED PLAINTIFFS IN-PATIENT STAY 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH PAIN CLINIC IS NOT AT ISSUE IN THIS 
LITIGATION. 
Plaintiff argues that defendant pre-authorized 
Plaintiff's Pain Clinic bills prior to his entering the Pain 
Clinic, and that it later refused to pay those claims. In fact, 
that was not an issue before the Lower Court. The only issue 
addressed by defendant in their investigation from May 2, 1986 to 
September 29, 1986, when plaintiff's insurance policy was cancelled 
by his employer, was whether plaintiff was employed by Peter Paul 
Prier. Finding 13. 
Plaintiff apparently claims that because defendant sent 
plaintiff an Explanation of Benefits form (which defendant's then-
claims manager testified was sent in error) noting that Pain Clinic 
claims would be paid at fifty (50%) percent and were pre-
authorized, defendant is bound, notwithstanding any other 
developments of any kind, to pay plaintiff's subsequent Pain Clinic 
medical bills. In fact, the issue of whether plaintiff was 
employed at all did not come up until after the defendant had sent 
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plaintiff the Explanation of Benefits form. 
The Lower Court found that on March 31, 1986, defendant 
received plaintiff's medical bills from the Pain Clinic. Finding 
4. The Lower Court then found that defendant sent plaintiff the 
Explanation of Benefits form noting pre-authorization on or about 
April 4, 1986. Finding 5. As set forth in defendant's Statement 
of Facts in its initial brief, defendant subsequently obtained 
medical records from the Pain Clinic, which records expressly 
stated that plaintiff told different Pain Clinic personnel that he 
was either working only part time or not at all. Tratnscript at 
393, 422; Trial Exh. 17, 18 (See Addenda 1 and 2 to defendant's 
initial brief). As discussed at length in defendant's initial 
brief, defendant was entitled to withhold any insurance benefits 
until the question of plaintiff's employment status was resolved 
(Section 11(B) of defendant's initial brief). 
Furthermore, the "pre-authorization" Explanation of 
Benefits form was sent to the plaintiff after April 4, 1986, two 
months after plaintiff entered the Pain Clinic for treatment. 
Finding 3. The Lower Court noted at the trial that the "pre-
authorization" Explanation of Benefits form could not be the basis 
for any contractual obligation on the part of the defendant to pay 
plaintiff's Pain Clinic bills, as the plaintiff could not have 
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relied upon it prior to entering the Pain Clinic. Transcript at 
538. 
Plaintiff claims that the independent insurance agent who 
sold defendant's health insurance policy to plaintiff was an agent 
(for purposes of imputation of knowledge) of the defendant. 
Contrary to plaintiff's allegations, no evidence was admitted 
before the Lower Court with regard to any alleged assurances of 
coverage given by this independent agent to plaintiff. In fact, 
defendant vigorously argued to the Lower Court that Mark Anderson 
was an independent insurance agent under Utah statutory provisions 
and case law, rather than an agent of defendant. Transcript at 44-
51; 481-491. The Lower Court never made a ruling on the agency 
question, but refused to allow hearsay testimony from the plaintiff 
with regard to any comments Mark Anderson may have made to the 
plaintiff. 
The pre-authorization non-issue was not a basis for any 
Finding or Conclusion of breach by the Lower Court, and plaintiff 
did not raise it in a cross-appeal. Accordingly, it should be 
ignored by this Court. 
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II. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO REBUT THE LEGAL AND RECORD CITATIONS 
OF DEFENDANT THAT DEFENDANT ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND DEALT 
FAIRLY WITH THE PLAINTIFF. 
In support of his argument that defendant did not act in 
good faith or deal fairly with him, plaintiff merely cites the Utah 
cases cited by the defendant in support of defendant's argument, 
without explaining how the facts in this case, within the standard 
set by Beck v, Farmerfs Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 
1985) and Callioux v, Progressive Insurance Company, 745 P.2d 838 
(Utah App. 1987), support plaintiff's claim of breach of contract. 
There is no discussion by plaintiff rebutting defendant's 
utilization of those cases in support of its argument of a good 
faith and reasonable investigation. 
Plaintiff cites Fletcher v. Western National Life 
Insurance Co. . 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) , for the proposition of bad 
faith interpretation of medical reports. Plaintiff doesn't say how 
or if defendant interpreted plaintiff's medical records in bad 
faith. In fact, plaintiff's medical records expressly raise 
questions as to plaintiff's employment status. This is undisputed 
in the record. See, Trial Exh. 17, 18 (Addenda 1 and 2 in 
defendants initial brief). The Lower Court failed to make any 
finding in that regard, which was error in light of those medical 
records being the very reason defendant initiated its investigation 
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of plaintiff's employment status. 
Also, where (as argued in defendant's initial brief) 
defendant was entitled to see evidence of plaintiff's employment 
status, and withhold insurance benefits until the question as to 
plaintiff's employment status was satisfactorily resolved, and 
plaintiff and his employer consistently refused to provide that 
information to the defendant, defendant did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously in denying plaintiff's claims until such records were 
provided. Bali v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, 873 F.2d 
1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 1989).* 
Plaintiff claims that some employees of the defendant 
wanted to know how many hours plaintiff was working per year; 
others wanted to know merely whether he was employed. This may be 
plaintiff's argument, but the Lower Court found that the only issue 
*The Seventh Circuit noted that the policy at issue in the 
Bali case entitled the policy administrator to require a disability 
claimant to submit to a medical examination at any time in order 
to determine whether the claimant was disabled, similar to (in this 
case) defendant's master policy entitling defendant to examine the 
records of plaintiff's employer at any time. The Seventh Circuit 
did not put the burden on the policy administrator in the Bali case 
to actually require the claimant to submit to a medical 
examination; rather, the Seventh Circuit found that the claimant 
was required to provide objective evidence of his disability to the 
policy administrator prior to requiring the policy administrator 
to pay benefits. Similarly, this Court should place the burden on 
plaintiff to provide his employment records when asked, in order 
to obtain benefits. 
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of concern to the defendant was whether plaintiff was employed, not 
how many hours he was working. Finding 13. 
Plaintiff claims that defendant took too long to 
investigate and deny Plaintiff's medical claims, and that such 
alleged delay did not conform to the letter or spirit of the Utah 
State Insurance Department regulations. The Lower Court made no 
findings that defendant breached such regulations, nor did 
plaintiff raise such claims in his pre-trial pleadings. Plaintiff 
points to no evidence in the record, nor any supportincj case law, 
to flesh out the conclusory and self-serving statement that 
defendant took too long to investigate and deny plaintiff's claims. 
III. PLAINTIFFS DAMAGES. 
Plaintiff attempts to rebut defendant's claim that the 
$5,000.00 awarded by the Lower Court to the plaintiff for 
consequential damages is unsupported in the record and is too 
speculative. First, plaintiff claims that the $5,000.00 is 
probably too low a figure, and then claims that defendant should 
have foreseen the emotional distress that a "professional musical 
conductor and violinist" would suffer in not having his insurance 
claims paid (plaintiffs brief at 15-16). Plaintiff cites no 
evidence in the record, nor any supporting case law, for the 
implicit proposition that musicians are more emotionally fragile 
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than anyone else, nor does he make any attempt to support the 
$5,000.00 figure with evidence in the record. 
Plaintiff argues that the $5,000.00 "are clearly a result 
of pain and suffering, inconvenience and loss of work opportunity 
that were extensively testified to in trial . . . " (plaintiffs 
brief at 17). Plaintiff does not cite to the transcript for any 
of the "extensive testimony" in support of this flagrantly self-
serving statement. Any increased pain and suffering and 
detrimental changes in plaintiff's health based upon defendant's 
alleged breach of contract or implied contractual covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is covered by the Lower Court's award of 
$3,500.00 in medical expenses incurred after plaintiff's coverage 
was terminated by his employer. Finding 17(b). 
There is no evidence in the record beyond sheer 
speculation to support the $5,000.00 award of consequential 
damages. Defendant argued in its initial brief at pages 39-40 
about plaintiff's so called "lost opportunities". There must be 
evidence in the record of actual lost opportunities, their 
causation, and the amount lost to sustain the $5,000.00 award. 
There is none. There is no evidence in the record that any alleged 
wrongful failure on the part of defendant to pay plaintiff's 
medical bills was causally connected to any lost opportunity. 
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Plaintiff's testimony about tentative discussions with out-of-state 
orchestras is not adequate to establish the certainty with which 
"lost opportunity" damages must be shown. Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 418-419 (Utah 1989). 
IV. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO REBUT DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT THAT THE 
LOWER COURT'S REFUSAL TO ADMIT DEFENDANTS NOTIFICATION 
LETTERS AND REQUEST FOR MEDICAL RECORDS AT TRIAL WAS ERROR. 
Plaintiff has failed to provide any case law challenging 
that set forth in defendant's initial brief at pages 21-24 in 
support of the proposition that the Lower Court should have 
admitted the evidence defendant provided at time of trial not 
earlier supplied to the plaintiff. Defendant acknowledges that the 
general rule regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence is 
that the trial court's decision will not be overturned in the 
absence of an abuse of discretion. Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 
781 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah App. 1989). However, at trial plaintiff 
did not show any exception to the general rule that such evidence 
should be admitted in the absence of: prejudice to the plaintiff, 
knowing concealment of the evidence by defendant, change in 
defendant's theories based upon the new evidence, or that the new 
evidence raised new issues. 
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In his responding brief plaintiff still hasn't rebutted 
the case law cited by defendant, nor pointed to any evidence in the 
record to fit within one of the exceptions to the general rule of 
admissibility. Accordingly, the Lower Court's denial of the 
admissibility of the evidence was error. 
V. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES BASED UPON AN 
APPEAL THAT IS EITHER FRIVOLOUS OR FOR DELAY PURPOSES. 
While plaintiff claims that he is entitled to attorney's 
fees for defending against defendant's frivolous appeal, he does 
not cite any evidence in the record, or provide any supporting case 
law, indicating that defendant's issues raised on appeal are 
frivolous, or that defendant brought the appeal solely for delay. 
While he claims that defendant's Statement of Facts, in its initial 
brief "mischaracterized and misstated the evidence presented by 
both parties at the trial," he does not at any time itemize his 
concerns with defendant's Statement of Factsjas defendant has at 
the beginning of this Reply Brief with regard to plaintiff's 
Statement of Facts. Other than making conclusory statements that 
the frivolous appeals entitle the defending party to attorney's 
fees, plaintiff states nothing that supports his claim of 
entitlement to such attorney's fees. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In his responding brief, plaintiff has provided no 
substantive rebuttal to defendant's factual and legal arguments 
supporting its appeal of the Lower Court's Judgment in favor of 
plaintiff. He has not rebutted defendant's claims about the 
inadequacy of the Lower Court's Findings of Fact, or the wrongful 
Findings made by the Lower Court in light of the overwhelming 
evidence in the record. Furthermore, plaintiff has provided no 
case law, in Utah or other jurisdictions, that rebuts the legal 
standard for determining a breach of insurance contract or breach 
of implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
articulated by defendant. Defendant has marshalled what facts are 
in the record to support the Lower Court's Findings, but the Lower 
Court's own underlying Findings do not support its ultimate 
Findings of breach and damages. 
Based upon the specific arguments set forth in its 
initial and reply briefs, defendant respectfully requests this 
Court to reverse the Lower Court's Conclusions that defendant 
breached its insurance contract with plaintiff and breached its 
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing with 
plaintiff, vacate the award of damages to the plaintiff, rule that 
defendant's counterclaim for attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
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defending against plaintiff's lawsuit has merit and should be 
granted, grant defendant its attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
bringing this appeal, and deny plaintiff's claims for attorney's 
fees incurred in defending against defendant's appeal. 
DATED this 5th day of January, 1990. 
TIBBALS, HOWELL, WILKINS & ORITT 
Jeffrey R. Oritt L 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Gem State Mutual of Utah 
- 17 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of January, 1990, 
I caused four true and correct copies of Defendant's Reply Brief 
to be hand-delivered to the following: 
John Preston Creer, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
36 South State Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
- 18 -
